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TIMBS V. INDIANA:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF CIVIL FORFEITURE
WHEN USED BY STATES
KRIS FERNANDEZ*
INTRODUCTION
Civil forfeiture, the seizure of property associated with the
commission of a crime, has long been used as a tool by Congress.1 In
theory, forfeiture should help deter crime and dismantle criminal
organizations by attacking their financial assets. However, some
criticize the seizure of valuable assets from those who have not
committed serious crimes.2 In Timbs v. Indiana, Petitioner Tyson
Timbs asks the Supreme Court to incorporate the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment against the states, providing extra
protection for individuals against fines and forfeiture that are “grossly
disproportionate” to the harm caused.3 The decision to incorporate
the Excessive Fines Clause and the guidelines for applying that
incorporation would have a substantial effect on governments, which
often rely on the revenue gained from forfeiture.
This commentary argues that the Supreme Court of the United
States should incorporate the Excessive Fines Clause based on
historical support of an individual’s right to be free from excessive
fines. Further, the Supreme Court should reaffirm its guidelines as
described in Bajakajian, which weigh the harm caused, the maximum
fines that could be levied against the defendant, and whether or not
the defendant is meant to be targeted by the statute.4 These guidelines
Copyright ©2019 Kris Fernandez.
*J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2020.
1. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 613 (1993).
2. Brief of Amicus Curiae Foundation for Moral Law in Support of Petitioners at 15–16,
Timbs v. Indiana, No. 17-1091 (Sept. 11, 2018).
3. Brief for Petitioners at 7, Timbs v. Indiana, No. 17-1091 (Sept. 4, 2018) [hereinafter
Brief for Petitioner].
4. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337–39 (1998).
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sufficiently protect individual rights but do not encroach on the
established societal expectation regarding property seizure. The
Supreme Court should remand the case back to the Indiana Supreme
Court with instructions to apply the Excessive Fines Clause in a way
that best weighs the Bajakajian factors.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
In January 2013, Petitioner used his father’s life insurance
proceeds to purchase a Land Rover for $42,058.38.5 Petitioner
regularly drove the Land Rover to transport heroin, and after several
controlled purchases by the police, Petitioner was apprehended.6 In
June 2013, Respondent Indiana charged Petitioner with two counts of
dealing in a controlled substance and one count of conspiracy to
commit theft.7 In 2015, Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of
dealing in a controlled substance and one count of conspiracy to
commit theft, in order to get the remaining charge dismissed.8
Petitioner was sentenced to six years, and he paid $1,203 in various
fines.9
Within two months after the criminal charges were filed,
Respondent also sought to acquire possession of Petitioner’s Land
Rover.10 The trial court held that requiring him to forfeit property of
such a high value is “grossly disproportional to the gravity of the . . .
offense” and would therefore violate the excessive fines portion of the
Eighth Amendment.11 The Court of Appeals affirmed.12 However, the
Indiana Supreme Court reversed, noting that the particular clause had
not yet been incorporated against the states by the United States
Supreme Court.13 The Indiana Supreme Court took a “cautious
approach” and avoided the federal question altogether.14 Because the
incorporation question was not decided, Indiana relied on its own

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

State v. Timbs, 84 N.E.3d 1179, 1181 (Ind. 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1183–84.
Id.
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constitution, which does not protect against excessive fines.15 As a
result, Respondent was entitled to take possession of the Land
Rover.16 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.17
B. Legal Background
1. History of Incorporation
The outcome in Timbs will rely on cases that establish the process
for incorporating sections of the Bill of Rights against the states. The
Bill of Rights imposes limitations and obligations on government
action, but precedent dictates that the Court will decide on a case-bycase basis which clauses can be used to challenge state action.18
Until the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Bill of Rights
could be used only to challenge federal action.19 In Barron v.
Baltimore, a plaintiff brought a claim against the state of Maryland
based on the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.20 The Court
held, however, that the “amendments contain no expression indicating
an intention to apply them to the state governments. This court cannot
so apply them.”21 The Framers of the Bill of Rights had intended state
governments to be conducted in accordance with their own state
constitutions, and the Bill of Rights did not indicate any intention to
breach that separation.22
After the American Civil War, the United States dramatically
shifted its stance on incorporating sections of the Bill of Rights
against states.23 In 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in
large part to protect the individual rights of recently freed Black
Americans.24 To bolster that goal, the amendment reads in relevant
part:

15. Id. at 1184–85.
16. Id. at 1185.
17. Timbs v. Indiana, 84 N.E.2d 1179 (Ind. 2017), cert, granted, 86 USLW 3625 (U.S. June
18, 2018) (No. 17-1091).
18. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 744 (2010).
19. Barron v. Balt., 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833)
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 775 (citing Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v.
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389 (1982)).
24. Id.
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“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”25

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
substantially different from the provisions of the Fifth Amendment.26
Specifically, it adds that a state cannot infringe on an individual’s
rights without due process, indicating that constitutional protections
are not limited to challenges against federal action.27
In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court laid out a process of “selective
incorporation” for determining which rights are protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment.28 These rights have been demarcated in a
variety of ways, but Duncan states that they are “fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions.”29 The Court recognized that the Bill of
Rights enumerates many of these fundamental principles, so courts
ought to look at the early amendments as guidance for what might
qualify.30 The Court should look at each clause individually,
determining if it is “essential to ‘a fair and enlightened system of
justice’” and is therefore protected under the Due Process Clause.31
The most recent incorporation case, McDonald v. City of Chicago,
provides a full description of clauses on which the Court has ruled.32
While the majority have been incorporated, some did not pass
muster.33 Until Malloy v. Hogan, the Court had incorporated
“watered-down” versions of the Bill of Rights clauses, holding states
to a lower standard than their federal counterparts.34 However, the
Court in Malloy was presented with the question of whether the Fifth
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V § 1 (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law”)
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
28. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161–162 (1968) (holding that the right to a trial
by jury was incorporated against the states).
29. Id. at 178 (quoting Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)).
30. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 763 (2010) (citing Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963)) (“. . . the Due Process Clause fully incorporates particular
rights contained in the first eight Amendments.”).
31. Id. at 760.
32. Id. at 764–66 (citing a complete list of cases in which the Supreme Court has decided
issues of selective incorporation).
33. Id.
34. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1964).
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Amendment privilege against self-incrimination gave the same
substantive rights against states as it did against the federal
government.35 The Court found it unreasonable that individuals would
have different fundamental rights in front of state judges than they
would before federal judges.36 It held that the guaranteed rights are to
be congruent.37
2. History of Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
As applied to federal action, the Supreme Court has interpreted
that the Eighth Amendment mandates that fines should be reasonably
proportional to a defendant’s conduct.38 Further, in Austin v. United
States, the Supreme Court held that forfeiture of property can be a
violation of the Excessive Fines Clause.39 The clause is triggered only
when the defendant is “punished.”40 Austin held that forfeiture is
sufficiently damaging to qualify as punishment when any part of the
motivation behind the forfeiture is to deter or to punish.41 The
forfeiture must be entirely remedial for it to escape scrutiny under the
Eighth Amendment.42
Assuming that a given fine or forfeiture is considered punishment,
United States v. Bajakajian created a test for determining if the
punishment is excessive such that it violates the Eighth Amendment.43
In Bajakajian, the defendant was charged with failing to report that he
was leaving the country with more than $10,000, a statutory
requirement.44 He pled guilty, but in the forfeiture bench trial, the
district court ruled that he was to forfeit the $357,144 he had
attempted to carry out of the country because that money was used in
the commission of a federal crime.45

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 604 (1993).
39. Id. at 622.
40. See id. at 610 (defining punishment as “a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely
to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive
or deterrent purposes”).
41. Id. at 621.
42. Id.
43. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337–39 (1998).
44. Id. at 325.
45. Id. at 325–26.
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The Supreme Court held that this forfeiture violated the
Excessive Fines Clause.46 It weighed (1) whether the defendant fit
into the “class of persons for whom the statute was principally
designed,” (2) the maximum penalties that could have been imposed
under the Sentencing Guidelines, and (3) the harm caused by the
defendant.47 In its application of the facts at bar to this test, the Court
found first that the law was designed to catch money launderers and
tax evaders, not forgetful people like the defendant.48 Second, the
Court found that the maximum monetary penalty was 1/70th of the
forfeiture.49 Finally, the Court found that the only harm caused by the
defendant was the failure to inform the government that $357,144 was
leaving the country.50 The Court held that the culpability and the harm
were not enough to justify the full forfeiture and therefore the
amount was “grossly disproportionate” to the wrong committed.51
II. HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Indiana rejected Petitioner’s argument that
the Excessive Fines Clause should be incorporated against the states.52
It deferred to the opinion in McDonald, in which the United States
Supreme Court chose not to identify the clause as previously
incorporated.53 The Supreme Court of Indiana chose a more cautious
approach, inviting the United States Supreme Court to rule on the
case while strictly applying Indiana law.54 Because Indiana law has no
constitutional protections against excessive fines that could be used in
Petitioner’s favor, the Court of Appeals’ affirming judgment was
reversed.55

46. Id. at 343.
47. Id. at 337–39.
48. Id. at 338.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 338–39.
51. Id.
52. State v. Timbs, 84 N.E.3d 1179, 1185 (Ind. 2017).
53. Id. at 1183.
54. See id. (holding that the Indiana Supreme Court will “await guidance” from the
Supreme Court).
55. Id. at 1184–85.
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III. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioner’s Argument
Petitioner argues that “almost all other rights would become
utterly worthless, if the government possessed an uncontrollable
power over the private fortune of every citizen.”56 This caution forms
the bedrock of Petitioner’s claim.57 Petitioner maintains that AngloAmerican history is littered with evidence, up to the present, that
people have the right to be free from fines grossly disproportionate to
the gravity of their offenses.58
Petitioner argues that the Excessive Fines Clause stems from a
long history of Anglo-American jurisprudence, making it “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” prior to the ratification
of the Eighth Amendment.59 The idea of a proportionality test for
fines goes back as far as the Magna Carta, which states that a “Freeman shall not be amerced for a small fault, but after the manner of the
fault; and for a great fault after the greatness thereof, saving to him his
contenement.”60 Fearing abuses from future kings, four hundred years
later, Parliament gave more specific direction regarding excessive
fines.61 Specifically, it sought to prevent kings from using unreasonable
fines to increase revenue at the cost of citizens.62 Against this
backdrop, the English Bill of Rights provided that “excessive Baile
ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and
unusuall Punishments inflicted. . .”63
The general principle of the English Bill of Rights was carried
forward to American jurisprudence.64 The language of the Eighth
Amendment was adopted directly from the Virginia Declaration of
Rights, which was adopted directly from the English Bill of Rights.65
Petitioner argues that the repeated prohibition on excessive fines

56. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3 at 2.
57. See id. at 8. (“The power to fine is—and has always been—a formidable one. And
unlike every other form of punishment, fines and forfeitures are a source of revenue for the
government, making them uniquely prone to abuse. The accompanying risk to life, liberty, and
property is very real.”).
58. Id. at 10.
59. Id. at 8 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010)).
60. Id. at 11.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 12.
63. Id. at 16.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 17.
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shows that the right is deeply rooted in Anglo-American
jurisprudence.66 Therefore, Petitioner argues that the Excessive Fines
Clause was intended to be incorporated against the states.67
Further, Petitioner argues that the right to be free from excessive
fines was a staple of American jurisprudence when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified.68 The Fourteenth Amendment was in large
part a response to “Black Codes,” which included efforts to subjugate
newly freed slaves with economic burdens.69 For example, without a
special license, people who taught or preached to people of color were
subject to heavy fines.70 Instead of heavy fines, people could “opt” to
labor on public roads or receive physical punishment.71 Further, in
Mississippi, Black Americans who were convicted of certain crimes
but were unable to pay the fines were “leased” to any person who
could pay the fine in their stead.72 The debates over the Fourteenth
Amendment made clear that many senators believed that these fines
were grossly unfair.73 One senator noted that a $1,000 fine for
trespassing would functionally condemn a Black American to a
lifetime of slavery.74 The draconian fines instituted by many states
were a particular target of the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and Petitioner believes that this indicates an intent to
incorporate the Excessive Fines Clause against the states.75
Petitioner maintains that other states joined with the federal
government in prohibiting excessive fines under their own state
constitutions.76 When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, thirtyfive of the thirty-seven state constitutions had adopted language
directly from the Excessive Fines Clause.77 The remaining two states
adopted some form of the proportionality test, functionally
prohibiting the same type of government behavior.78 Petitioner argues
that because this principle was universal across the states before the

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 24–25.
Id. at 24.
Id.at 24–25.
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Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment must have intended the Excessive Fines Clause to be
incorporated against the states.79
Further, Petitioner argues that the right enshrined in the Excessive
Fines Clause is just as imperative today as it was in the 1800s.80 When
the government has unlimited power to levy fines, it can create and
has created systems of perpetual punishment for minor crimes.81 Some
states have “auto-jail” policies for people who are unable to pay their
fines in a certain amount of time.82 Jailtime can result in job loss, an
increase of debt, and other long-term consequences for those who are
only responsible for minor harm.83 Forfeitures can have similar
consequences.84 For those who have taken out loans to purchase a car
or a house, the forfeiture of that property could be financially
devastating.”85 Petitioner argues that power over people’s property
could have “grave consequences” for personal liberty.86
Finally, Petitioner maintains that this power is “uniquely prone to
abuse.”87 When property is forfeited to the government, the proceeds
from that property generally go to the agency conducting the
seizure.88 Police departments, for example, depend on the revenue
from the forfeitures, even setting goals for how much money
departments should acquire from forfeiture.89 Petitioner argues that
individuals need to be protected from abuse in the event that the
survival of government agencies wholly relies on seizing property.90
B. Respondent’s Argument
Respondent argues that the question presented should be
construed narrowly, and that the proportionality test of the Excessive
Fines Clause should not apply to states exercising their power to seize
property in in rem proceedings.91 Respondent draws upon a wide

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 26–27.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Brief for Respondent at 4–7, Timbs v. Indiana, No. 17-1091 (Oct. 4, 2018) [hereinafter
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variety of historical evidence, concluding that a seizure of property
does not constitute a “fine” as understood by the Eighth Amendment,
and that forfeitures were never understood to be violations of
fundamental American rights.92
Respondent rejects Petitioner’s argument on the grounds that
historical evidence against the use of in personam fines should not
apply to questions regarding in rem forfeitures.93 Respondent
concedes that historical documents such as the Magna Carta provide
ample evidence that disproportionate monetary in personam penalties
could be opposed to fundamental Anglo-American rights.94
Nevertheless, there is a lengthy history of harsh in rem forfeitures that
have gone unchallenged.95 English admiralty courts and the American
colonies both utilized forfeitures to combat unlawful maritime
practices, and the early United States continued this practice, under
both the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution.96
The general acceptance of in rem forfeitures can be demonstrated
by the most draconian seizures by the federal government.97 For
example, in United States v. The Louisa Barbara, the federal
government enacted a strict weight-limit on maritime passengers.98
The ship in question only exceeded the limit by a single passenger, but
the court affirmed the federal government taking possession of the
entire four hundred-ton vessel.99 In similar cases, courts argued that
they had “no power” to go against the will of the legislature regarding
the seizure of property.100 Respondent maintains that if such
draconian outcomes like those in The Louisa Barbara went
unchallenged under the Excessive Fines Clause, then surely the
common understanding was that the clause did not apply to in rem
forfeitures.101

Brief for Respondent].
92. Id. at 5.
93. Id. at 6–7.
94. Id. at 45–46.
95. Id. at 22.
96. Id. at 18–19.
97. Id. at 22.
98. Id. at 23 (citing United States v. The Louisa Barbara, 26 F. Cas. 1000, 1001 (E.D. Pa.
1833)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 26 (citing United States v. Two Barrels of Whisky, 96 F. 479, 480 (4th Cir. 1899)).
101. Id.
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Respondent also argues that the “innocent owner rule”
demonstrates that the Eighth Amendment right in question does not
apply to in rem forfeitures.102 The innocent owner rule states that in in
rem proceedings, the innocence of an owner cannot be used as a
defense against the seizure of the property.103 So if a man lends his
vehicle to a friend in good faith, ignorant of her plot to use the vehicle
to transport drugs, his ignorance cannot be used to prevent the
government from seizing his vehicle.104 The innocent owner rule,
Respondent argues, demonstrates that the gravity of the owner’s
crime is irrelevant to the forfeiture of the property.105 If the owner has
done nothing wrong and his property can still be taken, then certainly
it can be taken if he is actually responsible for a crime.106 Respondent
notes that as early as 1844, the Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed the validity of the rule.107 In The Malik Adhel,108 Justice
Marshall wrote that the necessity of the forfeiture is determined “. . .
without any reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the
owner.”109 Respondent maintains that courts were well aware that the
results of the innocent owner rule may seem unfair.110 However, the
Supreme Court declared it to be “too firmly fixed in the punitive and
remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced.”111
Respondent notes that the Excessive Fines Clause has historically
been ignored in state in rem forfeiture cases, which demonstrates that
the common understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment was that it
did not apply to the seizure of property. Today, every state has
incorporated some form of the Excessive Fines Clause into their state
constitutions.112 And yet it was not until House and Lot v. State113 in
1920 that the Excessive Fines Clause’s application to in rem
forfeitures was even discussed.114 In that case, the Alabama Supreme

102. Id. at 23–24.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 24 (quoting The Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210, 233 (1844)) (“. . . the thing to
which the forfeiture attaches [is determined] without any reference whatsoever to the character
or conduct of the owner.”).
105. Id. at 26.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 24.
108. 43 U.S. 210, 233 (1844).
109. Brief for Respondent, supra note 91 at 24.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 27.
113. 204 Ala. 108 (Ala. 1920).
114. Brief for Respondent, supra note 91 at 28–29.
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Court rejected the use of the proportionality test for the validity of
the forfeiture.115 No state courts have disagreed with House and Lot’s
analysis.116
Further, no federal court even considered the possibility of the
Excessive Fines Clause applying to in rem cases until 1988.117 While
the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits all rejected its application, the
Second Circuit became the first to rule that in rem forfeitures were
subject to the proportionality test in 1992.118 Respondent argues that
this lack of discussion for two hundred years demonstrates that the
Excessive Fines Clause was never intended to be used as a defense to
in rem forfeiture. Had the general populace understood the clause to
apply to in rem forfeitures, the harshness of forfeiture would have
incentivized some litigants to use the clause as a defense.119 The
absence of any discussion on this front shows that it was not meant to
be applied to seizures of property.120
Respondent’s analysis of the historical evidence seeks to show
that the Excessive Fines Clause was not meant to be applied to in rem
proceedings, and therefore it should not apply to Petitioner’s Land
Rover.121 Therefore, Respondent ultimately argues that the Indiana
Supreme Court’s ruling should be upheld.
IV. ANALYSIS
This Part discusses two questions: whether the Excessive Fines
Clause should be incorporated against the states, and what should
qualify as an excessive fine. Ultimately, this Part contends that the
clause should be incorporated, but that the Court should allow lower
courts to have broad discretion in determining which fines are
classified as excessive. This approach would be consistent with federal
precedent regarding forfeiture.122

115. Id. at 28.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 29–30.
118. Id. at 30–31.
119. Id. at 27.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 58.
122. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337–39 (1998) (holding that a forfeiture
of $357,144 is unconstitutional when the defendant was not one of the class of persons intended
to be targeted by the statute, the maximum penalty for the statutory violation was $10,000, and
the harm caused was not substantial).
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A. The Excessive Fines Clause Should Be Incorporated Because Its
Support from Historical Practice Comports with Previous
Incorporations.
Petitioner’s historical argument successfully demonstrates that
Anglo-American tradition has valued protection from excessive fines
across time and jurisdictions. The Supreme Court has recognized that
demarcating fundamental rights often begins with historical
practice.123 Petitioner shows that the roots of the Excessive Fines
Clause stem from documents which are representative of older
Anglo-American tradition.124 Furthermore, Petitioner establishes that
the right to be free from excessive fines was intentionally enshrined
through the Fourteenth Amendment.125
The Excessive Fines Clause has a place in tradition which looks
very similar to that of previously-incorporated rights.126 In the past,
clauses from the Bill of Rights have been successfully incorporated,
but the historical support for these clauses as fundamental rights
rested on much more tenuous ground than the Excessive Fines
Clause. For example, in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,127 the
Court held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause was a
fundamental right to be incorporated against the states.128 In its
judgment, the Court stated: “Prohibition against the wanton infliction
of pain has come into our law from the Bill of Rights of 1688. The
identical words appear in our Eighth Amendment.”129 That selection
is the beginning and end of the Court’s discussion on the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause’s place in Anglo-American tradition.130
Similarly, the Excessive Fines Clause was taken directly from the
English Bill of Rights.131 Further, the Court has previously held that
because the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is placed in the
same list as the Excessive Fines Clause, they should occupy equal

123. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 744 (2010).
124. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3 at 11.
125. Id. at 11, 18, 19.
126. 561 U.S. at 765 n.13. McDonald held that the only rights not fully incorporated are “(1)
the Third Amendment’s protection against quartering of soldiers; (2) the Fifth Amendment’s
grand jury indictment requirement; (3) the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil
cases; and (4) the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines.”
127. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
128. Id. at 463.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3 at 10.
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standing as fundamental rights.132 Therefore, the Excessive Fines
Clause more than passes the standard for incorporation.
Finally, it is worth noting that even the Respondent fails to argue
that the Excessive Fines Clause should not be incorporated in some
fashion. To be sure, Respondent vigorously defends a narrow
construction, maintaining that an “excessive fine” does not apply to in
rem forfeitures.133 But the closest that Respondent comes to
advocating for non-incorporation comes at the end of its brief, where
it states that non-incorporation is the less attractive option compared
to merely excluding in rem forfeitures from the clause.134 Moreover,
both parties seem content that the Court incorporates the Excessive
Fines Clause for in personam fines.135
B. The Court Should Allow for Lower Courts to Have Broad
Discretion in Interpreting the Excessive Fines Clause Because Its
Historical Use and the Current Precedent Do Not Support an
Overaggressive Application.
Assuming that the Excessive Fines Clause will be incorporated,
the question remains as to what qualifies as an excessive fine.
Respondent’s historical evidence supports a more lenient
interpretation, but the Petitioner advocates for a hard boundary based
on historical evidence that protects a defendant’s livelihood against
fines for a minor violation.136 The Eighth Amendment has already
been applied at the federal level, and the results have not been overly
restrictive of government action.137 The Court should establish clear
guidelines that protect individuals according to the description of the
clause outlined in the Magna Carta, while still allowing for civil
forfeitures. The constitutionality test in United States v. Bajakajian
provides an effective measure and should be used as the test for
constitutionality.138 The test has been applied in lower court cases, and

132. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 263 (1989) (holding that
the Eighth Amendment as a whole limits government action, and therefore each clause in the
amendment has equal reason to be incorporated against the states).
133. Brief for Respondent, supra note 91 at 4.
134. Id. at 44–45.
135. Id.; Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3 at 8.
136. Brief for Respondent, supra note 91 at passim; Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3 at 11.
137. See United States v. Jose, 499 F.3d 105, 112 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that when (1) a
defendant is one of the class of persons a law is intended to target, (2) the amount forfeited is
more than four times the maximum monetary penalty for the statutory violation, and (3)
Congress states that violating the statute causes severe harm, the forfeiture is constitutional).
138. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337–39 (1998).
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while the proportionality of the penalties do not stray far from the
proportionality of historically-accepted in rem forfeitures, the
decisions still ensure that individual rights are protected.139
Understanding the contours of a fundamental right should begin
with historical practice.140 In this respect, Respondent has shown a
convincing pattern. Cases like The Louisa Barbara demonstrate that
the American legal system has traditionally not been diametrically
opposed to civil forfeitures.141 Indeed, the defendant never even raised
the Eighth Amendment question.142 The innocent owner rule also
works in Respondent’s favor, showing that in the past the defendant’s
culpability has not affected the fairness of the forfeiture. Petitioner
advocates for a rule that forbids fines that are not disproportionate to
the defendant’s wrongdoing, yet civil forfeiture is societally accepted
even when the property owner has done no wrong.143 Forfeitures of
items of value, which may even seem unfair to the average person,
likely do not infringe on the fundamental right.
However, Petitioner establishes a tradition that provides a strict
boundary on how much property the state can seize.144 The Magna
Carta established that financial punishment must reserve to the
defendant his livelihood, no matter how great the defendant’s fault.
As applied to cases like Timbs, individuals have a fundamental right
to protection from the government taking their livelihood.145 Possible
circumstances that would trigger this protection could include the
government seizing a car or a house when the defendant has just

139. See United States v. Jose, 499 F.3d 105, 113 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating that a forfeiture
which would deprive a defendant of her livelihood would violate the Excessive Fines Clause);
see also von Hofe v. United States, 492 F.3d 175, 187–88 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the civil
forfeiture of a farm valued at $124,000 was constitutional, when the defendant knew her son was
growing marijuana on the property and the maximum statutory penalties including $1 million
and twenty imprisonment); United States v. George, 779 F.3d 113, 124 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding
that the forfeiture of an equitable interest in a home worth under $100,000 was constitutional,
when the defendant knowingly hired an undocumented immigrant and the maximum statutory
fine of $250,000); United States v. Castello, 611 F.3d 116, 124 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the
forfeiture of over $12,000,000 plus the defendant’s equity in his home was constitutional when
the defendant failed to file Currency Transaction Reports as related to his check-cashing
business, enabling clients to commit fraud).
140. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 744 (2010).
141. See id. at 23 (showing that draconian civil forfeitures by the federal government have
historically not been challenged under the Excessive Fines Clause).
142. Id.
143. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3 at 4; Brief for Respondent, supra note 91 at 24.
144. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3 at 11.
145. See id. (“. . . a Free-man shall not be amerced for a small fault, but after the manner of
the fault; and for a great fault after the greatness thereof, saving to him his contenement.”).
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taken out a heavy loan on that property. The consequences of the
debt, along with potentially needing to pay for new transportation or
shelter, could endanger the defendant’s livelihood.
Taking these dual historical considerations together, the Supreme
Court has already established a set of guidelines that reconciles the
two values.146 The Court has held that Excessive Fines Clause analysis
is to take into account (1) whether the defendant falls into the class of
persons that the statute is designed to target; (2) the proportionality
when comparing the statutory penalties and the forfeiture; and (3) the
harm caused by the defendant.147 In Bajakajian, the Court found that
because the defendant did not fall into the class of targeted persons,
because the forfeiture was seventy times greater than the other
penalties, and because the harm was minimal, the forfeiture was
unconstitutional.148 This analysis takes into account the fairness of the
penalty, which the Magna Carta requires. However, it still allows for
steep penalties so long as other factors are satisfied, so the test does
not run afoul of historical forfeitures like the ship in Louisa-Barbara.
Since the decision in Bajakajian, lower courts have not hesitated
to find that large forfeitures are constitutional using the Bajakajian
test.149 After Bajakajian, the statutory penalties for failing to report
the $10,000 had been amended, and the First Circuit Court of
Appeals reached the opposite conclusion regarding the
constitutionality of a similar forfeiture.150 In Jose, the defendant was
also found to have left the country without declaring $10,000.151
However, the Patriot Act had bolstered the original statute.152 The
regulation now targeted anyone who had acquired money illegally, the
maximum penalty was increased six-fold with added jail time, and
Congress specified that the harm of not declaring money was
severe.153 Given these statutory changes, the court used the Bajakajian
test to determine that the defendant in Jose was required to forfeit all
$114,948 that he did not declare.154 In contrast with Bajakajian, the
forfeiture was proportionally much less in Jose.155 Further, Congress
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337–39 (1998).
Id.
Id.
E.g., United States v. Jose, 499 F.3d 105, 112 (1st Cir. 2007).
Id.
Id. at 110.
Id.
Id. at 111–12.
Id. at 113–14.
Id. at 112.
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had clarified in the amended statute that a violation of the statute
actually caused substantial harm.156 As shown in Jose, the federal test
for excessive fines comports well with societal expectations regarding
civil forfeiture as compared to the criminal responsibility of the
defendant. Outcomes in other federal civil forfeiture cases have been
similarly in line with historical practice.157 The harsh outcomes of
these cases may be unsettling, but the decisions are not out of step
with outcomes in cases like The Louisa Barbara.
The guidelines in Bajakajian and Jose are sufficient to account for
both the longstanding practice of civil forfeiture as presented by
Respondent, and Petitioner’s historical evidence that AngloAmerican jurisprudence seeks to protect individuals from excessive
fines. On Respondent’s side, the guidelines could reasonably lead to
the same outcomes in cases like The Louisa Barbara, even though
those outcomes might be considered draconian. On Petitioner’s side,
the Excessive Fines Clause does apply to civil forfeitures and the
protection is triggered in situations where the forfeiture is wildly
disproportionate and the defendant has not caused substantial harm.
Because Anglo-American jurisprudence has historically allowed civil
forfeiture but has also somewhat limited the proportion of the
forfeiture as compared to the harm caused, as seen in the Magna
Carta and early federal cases, the historical evidence does not weigh
decisively in favor of either Petitioner or Respondent.

156. Id.
157. E.g., United States v. George, 779 F.3d 113, 124 (2d Cir. 2015).
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V. CONCLUSION
In the end, historical practice and Anglo-American tradition are
somewhat at odds. However, several conclusions can be clearly drawn.
British legal tradition paved the way to a fundamental American
understanding that individuals should have some level of protection
from excessive financial punishments. This level of protection
includes, at the very least, the right to maintain one’s livelihood even
after a financial punishment is assessed. However, historical practice
also shows that heavy civil forfeitures were not understood to be
challengeable under the Excessive Fines Clause in the time
immediately following the Eighth Amendment’s ratification. Finally,
the guidelines in Bajakajian and Jose provide precedent for a
balancing test which has the effect of weighing the historical
considerations from both sides.
Given these conclusions, the Court should incorporate the Eighth
Amendment because Anglo-American tradition demarcates a strict
boundary for how much property can be seized through financial
punishment. If the punishment threatens the defendant’s livelihood, it
is unconstitutional. If the punishment falls short of threatening the
defendant’s livelihood, the Court should instruct lower courts to
follow its guidelines from Bajakajian and Jose. These guidelines will
protect an established function of the government, while also ensuring
that fines are not grossly disproportionate to the harm caused by the
defendant.

